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I. INTRODUCTION
While Virginia is not typically seen as "progressive" in the field
of product liability law, the Commonwealth is nonetheless a fo-
rum in which these product liability battles take place. This arti-
cle summarizes selected decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, federal district courts in Virginia,
and courts of the Commonwealth issued between July 1, 2004 and
May 15, 2005. This article also includes a discussion of the most
relevant legislative changes made by the Virginia General As-
sembly over the same time period. While a complete analysis of
every decision and statute affecting product liability is not possi-
ble, this article summarizes those which should be the most use-
ful to practitioners in Virginia.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
1. Failure to Request Adverse Inference for Spoliation Waives
Right to Bring Assignment of Error on Appeal
The Fourth Circuit was called upon to decide whether or not to
entertain a plaintiffs argument that she was entitled to an ad-
* In addition to cases dealing with product liability, this survey includes cases in-
volving civil procedure which will also prove useful to the practitioner.
** Partner, Troutman Sanders, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 1971, Long Island
University; J.D., 1975, University of Richmond School of Law; M.A., 1976, Long Island
University.
*** Associate, Troutman Sanders, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 2001, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute & State University, magna cum laude; J.D., 2004, University of
Richmond School of Law, summa cum laude.
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verse inference in the trial court based upon the defendant's al-
leged spoliation of evidence in Horton v. Synthes.' Horton, the
plaintiff, was involved in an automobile accident in which her leg
was broken, and her surgeon placed a plate and five screws
manufactured by Synthes in her leg to assist the healing process.2
Over an eighteen month period, two of the five screws broke and
her leg failed to heal.3 She was forced to undergo another surgery
in which the original screws were removed and a different type of
hardware was inserted.4 Horton filed suit against Synthes assert-
ing a breach of warranty with respect to the screws used in her
leg.5
Horton's case was tried in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia under the court's diversity juris-
diction.6 At the close of Horton's case, Synthes moved the trial
court to enter judgment as a matter of law against the plaintiff,
finding that she failed to establish any breach of warranty.7 After
the district court dismissed Horton's case, she appealed the dis-
trict court's decision, alleging that "she was entitled to an adverse
inference of defectiveness in light of the failure of one of Synthes'
employees to appear to testify."'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[a] district court has
inherent power to impose a sanction, including an adverse infer-
ence, for spoliation of evidence."9 Under federal law, the rule pro-
vides that an adverse inference may be drawn "'against a party
whose intentional conduct causes ... the destruction of evidence
:. . [and] against one who fails to preserve or produce evidence-
including the testimony of witnesses.'"' ° The court concluded,
however, that Horton's failure to raise the issue before the trial
court failed to adequately preserve the issue for appellate re-
view."
1. No. 04-2111, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 9628 (4th Cir. May 25, 2005).
2. Id. at *1.
3. Id. at *1-2.
4. Id. at *2.
5. Id.
6. Id. at*i.
7. See id. at *2.
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 2004)).
10. Id. (quoting Hodge, 360 F.3d at 450).
11. See id. at *2-3.
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Horton also contended that the district court erred in granting
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 12 Granting de novo review and review-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to Horton (the non-
moving party), the court concluded that Virginia law required her
to establish "'(1) that the goods were unreasonably dangerous ei-
ther for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or for some
other reasonably foreseeable purpose, and (2) that the unrea-
sonably dangerous condition existed when the goods left the de-
fendant's hands.'"'3 The metallurgist expert testifying for Horton,
however, "stated that he found no manufacturing defect, and ad-
mitted that he was not qualified to comment on the design of the
device."" Even the orthopedic expert called by the plaintiff testi-
fied that he had used the Synthes system on other occasions with
good results. 5 The court concluded that "even giving Horton the
benefit of all inferences, . . . she failed to establish her cause of ac-
tion[,] [tiherefore, judgment as a matter of law was properly
granted."
6
2. Determining the State of Residence for National Banking
Associations
The Fourth Circuit was asked in Wachovia Bank, N.A., v.
Schmidt 7 to interpret 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1348 with respect to
national banking associations. 18 Wachovia was sued in South
Carolina state court for allegedly fraudulently inducing "the
plaintiffs to engage in a risky tax-motivated investment
scheme." 9 Several months later, Wachovia sought a petition from
the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
"seeking an order compelling arbitration and a motion to compel
12. See id. at *3.
13. Id. at *3-4 (quoting Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 428, 219
S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975)).
14. Id. at *4.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 2004).
18. Id. at 415-16.
19. Id. at 416.
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arbitration of the state claims."2' The district court denied Wa-
chovia's petition, and Wachovia appealed.2'
On appeal, Schmidt contended, for the first time, that the dis-
trict court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case be-
cause the parties were not diverse. 22 To support this, Schmidt ar-
gued that national banking associations are located in each state
in which they operate branches for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1348,
and thus are citizens of each of those states for purposes of diver-
sity jurisdiction.23 The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that "[i]t is
indisputable that a national banking association becomes physi-
cally present in a state when it opens branch offices in that state
and conducts business there."24 The court reasoned that "within
the ordinary meaning of 'located,' a national banking association
is 'located' wherever it operates branch offices."" Because Wacho-
via had branch offices in South Carolina, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that there was no diversity of citizenship and that its peti-
tion should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.26
Although not dealing with product liability law specifically,
this case is nonetheless relevant because the vast majority of
product liability cases within federal court are grounded in the
court's diversity jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit's ruling essen-
tially removes federal courts as a permissible forum for product
liability claims in any case in which a national banking associa-
tion is a party.
3. Qualifying Experts under the Daubert Standard
The Fourth Circuit in Higgenbotham v. KCS International,
Inc. 21 was asked to decide whether the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland erred in finding that the plain-
tiffs sole expert was unreliable and unscientific.2"
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000)).
24. Id. at 416-17 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 92).
25. Id. at 417.
26. See id. at 432.
27. No. 02-1527, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 947 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 2004) (unpublished de-
cision).
28. See id. at *3.
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KCS International, Inc. manufactured the yacht owned by the
plaintiff on which he was allegedly injured.29 The swim platform
ladder was stuck in the closed position but released suddenly and
swiftly when the plaintiff attempted to force the ladder open.3" He
was thrown against the transom of the yacht injuring his back
and shoulder when the ladder released without warning.3
In his case against the defendant, the plaintiff called a naval
engineer who had knowledge of ladders used on swimming plat-
forms on marine vessels to testify that the defect in the ladder
was the result of normal use of the ladder.3 2 The district court
found that the plaintiffs expert was unreliable and that the
plaintiffs claim should be dismissed for failing to establish a
causal link between the alleged defect and his injury.33
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that "an expert's testi-
mony is admissible under Rule 702 if it 'rests on a reliable foun-
dation and is relevant.'"34 The court upheld the district court's ex-
clusion of the plaintiffs expert, finding that he merely stated that
the defect in the ladder would have been less likely to occur had
the manufacturer used steel rather than aluminum.3" The Fourth
Circuit concluded that just because a better material exists, it
does not necessarily mean that the use of an inferior material
constituted a design defect.36 Accordingly, the plaintiffs expert
was not reliable for purposes of establishing a design defect at
trial.
4. Creating Privity Through Agency for Breach of Warranty
Purposes
The Fourth Circuit in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Cooperative Ass'n v. Crowell Farms3 was asked to determine
29. See id. at *4.
30. See id. at *3-4.
31. Id. at *4.
32. See id. at *2, 7 n.1.
33. Id. at *2-3.
34. Id. at *6 (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999)).
35. See id. at *16-17.
36. See id. at *15.
37. See id. at *15-16.
38. No. 03-1769, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11343 (4th Cir. June 9, 2004) (unpublished
decision).
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whether a cooperative reimbursement of a purchaser for con-
taminated milk was subject to indemnification in a breach of war-
ranty suit.3 9 The Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Coopera-
tive (the "Cooperative") paid Milkco, a milk-producing facility,
almost $500,000 in damages after Milkco discovered that the milk
it purchased was contaminated with antibiotics. 4' The Coopera-
tive sought to be reimbursed by Crowell Farms ("Crowell") for the
amount it paid to Milkco because it was Crowell's milk that was
contaminated and created the obligation.4' Crowell maintained
that it was not obligated to pay the Cooperative because it never
was contractually obligated to pay Milkco. for the contaminated
milk, and the Cooperative voluntarily decided to pay Milkco of its
own accord.42
In reviewing the facts of the case, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the
Cooperative because the Cooperative was in privity with Crowell,
as it was acting as Crowell's agent for purposes of selling its milk
to purchasers.43 Because Crowell, and thus the Cooperative, sold
adulterated milk to Milkco, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
implied warranty of merchantability was breached and that Co-
operative was entitled to reimbursement from Crowell.'
B. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia
1. Unilateral Pre-Injury Release Provisions
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, in Green v. Sauder Mouldings, Inc.," held that a pre-
injury release and indemnification provision was "violative of the
public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and [was] thus
void."46 The case resulted from an accident in which a boom lift
39. See id. at *6.
40. See id. at *4-6.
41. See id. at *5-6.
42. Id. at *6-7.
43. Id. at *14.
44. See id. at *11, 14.
45. 345 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2004).
46. Id. at 613.
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tipped over and resulted in significant personal injuries.47 United
Rentals Incorporated and United Rentals North America (collec-
tively "United") claimed that Sauder Mouldings ("Sauder") was
obligated to indemnify and hold United harmless for any claim
made by the plaintiff against them as a result of the pre-injury
release and indemnification clause contained in the lease agree-
ment between United and Sauder.4"
The court concluded that the pre-injury release and indemnifi-
cation language "was not bargained for or negotiated, and repre-
sent[ed] more of a unilateral release provision."49 Finding that
such unilateral releases were not permitted under Virginia law,
the court noted that upholding such a unilateral release "'would
be to hold that it was [acceptable] for one party to put the other
parties to the contract at the mercy of its own misconduct, which
can never be lawfully done .... Public policy forbids it, and con-
tracts against public policy are void.'
50
2. Parents Litigating Pro Se on Behalf of Minor Children
In Gallo v. United States,51 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia determined that "[ilt is generally
not in the interest of a child to be represented by a non-attorney,
who will likely be unable to adequately protect [the child's] rights
and vigorously prosecute litigation on [the child's] behalf."5 2 In
Gallo, a mother filed suit against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act53 for allegedly providing negligent care to
her and her child while at the William Beaumont Army Medical
Center in Texas.54
The United States filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that "a parent or guardian cannot litigate pro se on
47. See id. at 611.
48. See id. at 611-12.
49. Id. at 612.
50. Id. (quoting Johnson's Adm'x v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 86 Va. 975, 978, 11
S.E. 829, 829 (1890)).
51. 331 F. Supp. 2d 446 (E.D. Va. 2004).
52. Id. at 448.
53. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.
54. See Gallo, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
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behalf of a child."55 The court reasoned that "[a]lthough 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 gives litigants the right to bring civil claims pro se, courts
are nearly unanimous in holding that a parent or guardian can-
not sue on behalf of a child without securing counsel."56 Agreeing
with other courts that had ruled on the subject, the court con-
cluded that while representing her daughter pro se, the mother
"risks running her daughter's potentially meritorious claim
aground."57
The court noted, however, that granting the government's re-
quest to dismiss her claim would prevent the daughter from "liti-
gat[ing] her claim on her own behalf when she reaches adult-
hood."" Because the rule against allowing pro se parents to
represent their children's interest is to protect the children, "[i]t
would be a perverse result to rest dismissal [of the daughter's]
claim on th[at] ground .. .as she is clearly the person the rule
means to protect." 9 The court ordered the mother to secure legal
counsel within sixty days of its order, or the court would recon-
sider dismissing the daughter's claim without prejudice. 0
3. Bad Faith Attempts to Defeat Removal on Diversity Grounds
In Schwenk v. Cobra Manufacturing Co.,61 the plaintiff served
a motion for judgment on the defendant in which he alleged "'se-
rious and permanent injuries' when he fell off of a tree step, used
for hunting, manufactured by the [d]efendant."" The motion for
judgment demanded "$74,000 in damages, plus prejudgment in-
terest and costs."6" In response, the defendant served a request
for admission on the plaintiff, seeking an admission that "'the to-
tal damages recoverable by [the plaintiff] .. . [did] not exceed
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1998);
Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1997); Cheung v. Youth Or-
chestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d
153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 172
(E.D. Va. 1994)).
57. Id. at 448.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 449.
61. 322 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Va. 2004).
62. Id. at 677.
63. Id.
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$75,000. '64 The plaintiff simply stated that the motion for judg-
ment requested only $74,000 and that he reserved his right to
amend the motion for judgment at a later time.65
Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed a notice of removal with
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, asserting that the court had diversity jurisdiction over the
case.66 The plaintiff responded to the notice by alleging that di-
versity jurisdiction did not exist because the amount in contro-
versy did not exceed $75,000 and that the defendant was too late
in filing his notice of removal.67 The court, however, was less than
convinced by what it determined was the plaintiffs "attempt to
avoid the diversity jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)."68 Such an attempt, the court reasoned, was
clearly an "attempt to manipulate the system constitut[ing] bad
faith by [p]laintiff's counsel and will not be tolerated by this
Court."69 The court made clear that under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),
"the Court is not bound by the amount the [plaintiff pleads in the
state action," but rather, "the Court must look at the totality of
the circumstances."7 °
The plaintiffs second argument was that the defendant's notice
of removal was not filed within the thirty-day limit mandated by
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 71 In cases that are not immediately remov-
able, the court reasoned that "the defendant has 'thirty days after
receipt . . .of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or
other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case
is one which is or has become removable ... ' to file its notice of
removal."72 In the case before it, the court concluded that the
"[plaintiffs refusal to admit or stipulate that the amount in con-
troversy [did] not exceed $75,000 was the 'other paper' from
which the [diefendant first learned that the case was remov-
64. Id. (first alteration in original).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 678.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding
that plaintiffs who "plead for damages below the jurisdictional amount in state court with
the knowledge that the claim is actually worth more, but also with the knowledge that
they may be able to evade federal jurisdiction by virtue of the pleading" is bad faith)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 679-80.
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able."73 Thus, a defendant has thirty days from whatever time
any document or other form of information comes into its posses-
sion that alerts the defendant that the case is removable.
4. More Problems With Diversity-The One Year Bar on
Removal
Once again faced with questions concerning its diversity juris-
diction, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. PMA Capital Insurance Co.
74
was asked to determine "[wihether § 1446(b)'s one year diversity
removal bar precludes removal where, as here, removal occurred
more than one year after the case was filed in Virginia state
court, but less than one year after defendant was joined and
served with process." 75 The case involved a fifty-million dollar in-
surance dispute involving a business interruption in the wake of
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.76 In reviewing the law
surrounding removal and remand of diversity actions, the court
concluded that "in Virginia an action commences, for purposes of
removal as well as for other purposes, on the date of filing of the
initial motion for judgment," regardless when a particular defen-
dant is served with process.77 Therefore, the court concluded that
in accordance with the plain language of § 1446(b) and Rule 3:3 and
the principles that removal must be strictly construed and any
doubts resolved in favor of remand, the one year diversity removal
bar commenced to run on the date the action was commenced by the
filing of the motion for judgment.78
73. Id. at 680 (citing Yarnevic v. Brink's, Inc., 102 F.3d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1996) (defin-
ing "other paper" as "broad enough to include any information received by the defendant,
'whether communicated in a formal or informal manner'"); Rodgers v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 952 F. Supp. 325, 328 n.4 (W.D. Va. 1997) ("Suffice it to say.., that an ad-
mission by a party constitutes an 'other paper' within the meaning of § 1446(b).")).
74. 340 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. Va. 2004).
75. Id. at 701.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 707.
78. Id. at 709.
[Vol. 40:269
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
C. United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia
1. A New Fold to Pharmaceutical Liability-Expert Testimony
Required to Prove Causation
In McCauley v. Purdue Pharma L.P., the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia decided a case
arising "out of the misuse of prescription drugs that has ravaged
many rural communities, particularly in the Appalachian
South." ° The most widely discussed and notarized drug in this
"epidemic" is the opioid, OxyContin.8' As distinguished from other
pain killers, OxyContin's active ingredient-oxycodone-"is deliv-
ered via a controlled-release formulation, leading each tablet to
provide pain relief for more hours than traditional immediate-
release formulations and allowing patients to thus take fewer
doses per day." 2 Accordingly, "each tablet of OxyContin contains
more milligrams of active oxycodone than does a single tablet of
other opiate pain medications." 3
The plaintiffs, a group of individuals who had been prescribed
OxyContin, filed suit alleging that "they became dependent upon
or addicted to opioids only after they started their treatment with
OxyContin and suffered personal harm and financial loss. " 4 Be-
cause the plaintiffs had been prescribed and had taken other
opioids prior to and during their ingestion of OxyContin, Purdue
Pharma L.P. ("Purdue"), the primary manufacturer of OxyContin,
asserted that the plaintiffs' dependence could not be causally
linked to their ingestion of OxyContin. 8 Accordingly, Purdue rea-
soned that the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failing to
prove causation. 6
79. 331 F. Supp. 2d 449 (W.D. Va. 2004).
80. Id. at 450.
81. See id. The court notes than "an 'opioid' is a synthetic drug with the properties of
an opiate, but not directly derived from opium." Id. at 450 n.2 (citing MERRIAM WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 815 (10th ed. 1996)).
82. Id. at 452.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 452-60.
86. See id. at 452.
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The three plaintiffs 7 discussed in the court's opinion all alleged
similar impacts from their use of OxyContin. 8 Each plaintiff took
other pain medications prior to OxyContin and had either devel-
oped a tolerance to the other pain medications or needed addi-
tional medication to cope with the pain. 9 Each man suffered from
a substance abuse problem, engaged in behaviors that were de-
signed to thwart and subvert the chemical dependence checks
utilized by pharmacies, and eventually went in and out of reha-
bilitation clinics. 90
Purdue called several expert scientists who testified that
"OxyContin [was] not the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries because
the plaintiffs had engaged in using other opioids, both prior to
and concurrent with their use of OxyContin."9' The first expert,
Dr. Kathleen T. Brady, testified that "OxyContin 'if taken repeat-
edly over an extended period of time at a sufficiently high dose,
causes physical dependence[,' and that the severity of this de-
pendence depends on various factors, including the duration of
opioid intake, the dosage, and the co-utilization of other drugs."92
The second expert, Dr. John A. Hagy, similarly opined that any
substance abuse problem allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs was
the result of their long histories of opioid use and not from the
use of OxyContin. 93 The final expert, Dr. Marc A. Swanson, con-
cluded that "'it is rare for a patient without a prior history of
abuse to become addicted to opioids prescribed for pain when that
patient is properly monitored by the physician.' 94 Faced with
87. The three plaintiffs were A.F. McCauley, Charles C. Brummett, and Joseph D.
Deckard. See id. at 452, 455, 457.
88. Id. at 451.
89. With respect to plaintiff McCauley, he was first "prescribed several short-release
opioid medications, including Endocet and Percocet, and additionally first prescribed Oxy-
Contin ... on January 31, 2000." Id. at 453. Plaintiff Brummett had taken several opioids,
"including Percocet, Lorcet, Lortab, and Endocet" prior to being prescribed OxyContin to
be taken along with Endocet. Id. at 455. Lastly, plaintiff Deckard, after developing a toler-
ance to hydrocodone-the active ingredient in Lorcet and Lortab-was prescribed Oxy-
Contin. See id. at 457.
90. See id. at 453-59.
91. Id. at 459.
92. Id. (alteration in original). Dr. Brady also specifically noted that "if any of the
plaintiffs '... had a substance use disorder with regard to opioids, he had that substance
use disorder long before he was prescribed' OxyContin, and that 'any consequences [he]
experienced [were] not caused by [OxyContin], but by a history of opioid use.'" Id. (altera-
tions in original).
93. Id. at 459-60.
94. Id. at 460.
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Purdue's three experts, the plaintiffs failed to designate any ex-
perts to refute the only scientific testimony before the court.95
In response to plaintiffs' failure to designate any experts, Pur-
due sought summary judgment.96 Under Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is mandated, "'after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial."'97 Agreeing that Vir-
ginia law controlled the only remaining claims, the plaintiffs were
confronted with "the burden to produce evidence showing that the
defendant was the proximate cause of the injury sustained."" The
court concluded, however, that "[tlhe evidence [was] undisputed
that McCauley, Brummett, and Deckard were all regular users of
opioid pain medications prior to ever being prescribed OxyCon-
tin."99 In sum, the court found that "the plaintiffs have failed to
create a genuine issue of material fact that their use of OxyCon-
tin was the proximate cause of their alleged injuries because
there is inadequate evidence to differentiate between the plain-
tiffs' use of OxyContin and the other medications taken by
them.""o
The court noted that Virginia law does not require the use of
expert testimony to prove causation.' °' Where the cause of action
deals with product liability, however, the court instructed that,
"proof of causation must ordinarily be supported by expert testi-
mony because of the complexity of the causation facts."102 Despite
the high level of complexity associated with proving drug depend-
ence, the plaintiffs' failed to designate an expert who could estab-
lish even some causal link between OxyContin and their inju-
95. See id.
96. See id. The court noted that "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when there is 'no
genuine issue of material fact,' given the parties' burdens of proof at trial." Id. (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
97. Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
98. Id. at 461. In Virginia, proximate cause is "'that act or omission which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the event,
and without which that event would not have occurred.'" Id. (quoting Beale v. Jones, 210
Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 462.
101. See id. at 464.
102. Id. (citing Rorhbough v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 916 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1990)).
20051
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ries.' Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor
of Purdue. 
10 4
2. Imputing an Adverse Inference-Punishment for Spoliation
In Ward v. Texas Steak Ltd.,"°' the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia was asked to determine
whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages he suffered
as a result of a defective chair at the Texas Steakhouse restau-
rant.10 6 The defendants moved for summary judgment claiming
that the plaintiff could not establish constructive notice of the al-
legedly defective condition.0 7
The plaintiff was having dinner at the local Texas Steakhouse
restaurant for over an hour without any incident or warning that
something was wrong with the chair in which he was sitting.'
Suddenly, and unexpectedly, the chair collapsed, injuring Ward's
lower back and right elbow.0 9 An employee of the restaurant gave
the plaintiff a new chair and the assistant manager placed the
broken chair in the dumpster."0 The assistant manager then
helped the plaintiff prepare an accident report and faxed it to the
defendant's corporate headquarters that night."' At no time was
the defendant ever asked to recover the damaged chair, nor was
there ever any attempt to do so." 2
The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the defendants al-
leging that they "were negligent for failing to discover and warn
him about the defect in his chair."" 3 In order to establish the li-
ability of a premises owner for passive conduct, the plaintiff
"must establish evidence of actual or constructive notice of a dan-
gerous condition on the part of the defendant, and a failure by de-
103. See id. at 462-65.
104. Id. at 465.
105. No. 7:03cv00596, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10575 (W.D. Va. May 27, 2004).
106. Id. at *1.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at *3.
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fendant to reasonably react to such conditions."114 Although the
plaintiff put forth no evidence of any notice on the part of the de-
fendants, he contended that they "failed to do so because the de-
fendants destroyed the chair.""' Such a destruction of evidence,
the plaintiff argued, warranted the court imposing "an adverse
inference" that the defendants had such notice. 116
The court initially grappled with the question of whether the
spoliation of evidence should be determined by Virginia law or
federal common law." 7 The court concluded that "when spoliation
of evidence does not occur in the course of pending federal litiga-
tion, a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction in which the
rule of decision is supplied by state law is required to apply those
spoliation principles the forum state would apply.""' Under Vir-
ginia law, "where one party destroys material evidence, the other
party may be entitled to an inference that the evidence, 'if it had
been offered, would have been unfavorable to [the party destroy-
ing the evidence]."'' 9 Because spoliation in Virginia can arise
through either intentional or negligent conduct, "[a] spoliation in-
ference may be applied in an existing action if, at the time the
evidence was lost or destroyed, 'a reasonable person in the defen-
dant's position should have foreseen that the evidence was mate-
rial to a potential civil action.""2
The court concluded that because the plaintiff informed the as-
sistant manager that he would likely file a claim unless the pain
stopped, an adverse inference was appropriate against the defen-
dants.'2 ' The court reasoned that "despite knowing of the poten-
tial dispute and that the chair would be relevant evidence in a
dispute, the defendants made no effort to preserve the chair."'22
Thus, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the
court concluded that the "defendants acted negligently by not at-
tempting to preserve the chair and that [the plaintiff was] enti-
114. Id. (citing Ashby v. Faison & Assocs., 247 Va. 166, 170, 440 S.E.2d 603, 605
(1994)).
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id.
117. See id. at *5-7.
118. Id. at *7.
119. Id. (quoting Wolfe v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Program,
40 Va. App. 565, 580-81, 580 S.E.2d 467, 475 (Ct. App. 2003)).
120. Id. at *8 (quoting Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ill. 1995)).
121. See id. at *9.
122. Id.
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tled to an inference that, had the chair been preserved, it would
have provided some evidence unfavorable to the defendants." 23
With the adverse inference in favor of the plaintiff, the defen-
dants' motion for summary judgment was denied. 24
D. Courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia
1. Regular Visits to a Physician as a Basis for Venue
125
The Richmond City Circuit Court was asked in Gaynor v.
Wood 126 to determine whether regular visits to one's physician
constitute "affairs or business activity" for the purposes of venue
under Virginia Code section 8.01-262(3).127 The defendant made a
motion to change venue, citing the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Meyer v. Brown 28 as support. 129 For purposes of decid-
ing the defendant's motion to change venue, "the parties agree[d]
that any basis for venue here would be derived from defendant's
contacts with her gynecologist centering around office visits and
surgery and follow-up surgery, all occurring ... both before and
after filing." 3 ° Judge Hughes determined that the defendant's
doctor's visits were not "either 'affairs or business activity' as ei-
ther commercial, professional, or public business or business ac-
tivity."13' As a result, he granted the defendant's motion to trans-
fer venue. 132
123. Id.
124. Id. at *10.
125. Under Virginia law, where a cause of action involves multiple parties and venue is
permissible as to one party, it is permissible for all of the parties. See Claypoole v. Ag-
Chem Equip. Co., Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 404, 405 (Cir. Ct. 1986) (Richmond City). Thus, where
venue is permissible for a medical doctor in a product liability case, it will be deemed per-
missible for the pharmaceutical company as well.
126. 64 Va. Cir. 143 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (Richmond City).
127. Id. at 143.
128. 256 Va. 53, 500 S.E.2d 807 (1998).
129. Gaynor, 64 Va. Cir. at 143.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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2. Using Internet Sales as a Basis for Asserting Personal
Jurisdiction
The Fairfax County Circuit Court in Malcolm v. Esposito'33 was
asked to decide whether a Connecticut car dealership's sale of a
car on eBay was a sufficient contact with Virginia to grant the
court in personam jurisdiction over the dealership.'34 The defen-
dant dealership advertised an automobile for auction on the eBay
website, which was bid on and won by the plaintiff, a resident
and domiciliary of Virginia.135 Prior to delivery, the plaintiff dis-
covered that the car had a manufacturing defect which was not
disclosed by the seller and sought to rescind the agreement.'36
Upon the defendant's refusal to rescind the agreement, the plain-
tiff filed suit alleging a breach of warranty, fraud, and violation of
the Virginia Consumer Protection Act.137
The defendant made a special appearance in the Fairfax
County Circuit Court to contest that court's personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. 38 In reviewing the defendant's challenge to
the court's jurisdiction, the court noted that "[tlhe purpose of the
long-arm statute 'is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who
engage in some purposeful activity in Virginia, to the extent per-
missible under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the
United States.""39 Under Virginia law, each bid made at an auc-
tion without reserve is a consummation of a contract. 4 ° The court
concluded that because the defendant had no control over the
eventual buyer at the auction, and because the defendant had
"'consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all
internet users, knowing that such information would be transmit-
ted globally,'"'4 sufficient contacts existed with Virginia to pro-
vide the court with personal jurisdiction over the defendant sell-
ers.142
133. 63 Va. Cir. 440 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Fairfax County).
134. See id. at 441.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 442 (quoting Nan Ya Plastics Corp. USA v. DeSantis, 237 Va. 255, 259, 377
S.E.2d 388, 391 (1989)).
140. Id. at 443 (citing Holston v. Pennington, 225 Va. 551, 557, 304 S.E.2d 287, 290
(1983)).
141. Id. at 446 (quoting Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D.
Mo. 1996)).
142. See id.
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III. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
A. Federal Legislation-The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005141
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was signed into law by
President George W. Bush on February 18, 2005.1' Although de-
claring class action lawsuits to be an important and integral part
of the nation's legal system, Congress criticized the mechanism as
being widely abused-injuring consumers, commerce, and the ju-
dicial system as a whole.' Congress passed the Class Action
Fairness Act to:
(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with legiti-
mate claims; (2) restore the intent of the framers of the United
States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of
interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction;
and (3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering con-
sumer prices.
146
One of the most important changes in the legislation was the
expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction in class actions to in-
clude actions in which the aggregate value of plaintiffs' claims ex-
ceeds five million dollars and minimal diversity of jurisdiction ex-
ists. 14 Minimal diversity of citizenship, for purposes of most class
action lawsuits, exists where any plaintiff has a different citizen-
ship from any defendant at the time the lawsuit was filed.'"
Additionally, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 provides
federal courts with jurisdiction over "mass tort" cases-"any civil
action ... in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons
are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs'
claims involve common questions of law or fact."'49 Much like the
143. This legislation is especially important for Virginia plaintiffs because class action
suits are not permitted within the state court system.
144. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
145. See id. § 2(a)(1)-(4), 119 Stat. at 4-5.
146. See id. § 2(b)(1)-(3), 119 Stat. at 5.
147. See id. § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. at 9-12 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (6)).
148. See id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)-(C)). There are, however, other
restrictions and requirements that must be met before a federal district court's expanded
federal jurisdiction is available. See id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A)-(C)).
149. Id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)). Such class actions must meet
the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement currently in existence for federal diversity
actions. See id.
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expansion of the federal district courts' diversity jurisdiction,
however, there are numerous restrictions on the availability of
the court's mass tort jurisdiction. 5 °
The act also provides that class actions may be removed under
28 U.S.C. § 1446 "without regard to whether any defendant is a
citizen of the [s]tate in which the action is brought," and may be
removed "by any defendant without the consent of all defen-
dants."'51
Lastly, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 includes a "Class
Action Bill of Rights" for class members in class actions through-
out the United States.'52 Without going into the cumbersome de-
tails of the bill of rights, the law essentially seeks to (1) modify
coupon settlements in class action suits to limit the amount of re-
coverable attorneys' fees;' 53 (2) prohibit any settlement that would
result in a net loss for class members, without court approval;
1 4
(3) mandate equal treatment among class members; 55 and (4) re-
quire notice to be given to public officials of any settlement prior
to court approval.'56 The impact of this legislation on class action
lawsuits from a practical perspective remains to be seen.
150. A "mass action" does not include actions in which: (1) the claims arise from an
event or occurrence in the forum state and that causes injuries in that state or contiguous
states; (2) the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant; (3) the claims are asserted on
behalf of the general public pursuant to a state statute specifically authorizing such ac-
tion; or (4) the claims have been consolidated solely for pretrial proceedings. See id. (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)-(IV)).
151. See id. § 5(a), 119 Stat. at 12-13 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)). In addi-
tion, the one-year limitation in § 1446(b) does not apply. Id.
152. See generally id. § 3(a), 119 Stat. at 5-9.
153. See id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1712).
154. See id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1713).
155. See id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1714).
156. See id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1715). The notice must contain: (1) a copy of
the complaint; (2) a notice of any scheduled hearing; (3) any proposed or final notification
to class members; (4) any proposed or final settlement; (5) any agreement made "contem-
poraneously" between class counsel and defense counsel; (6) the final judgment or notice of
dismissal; (7) "if feasible, the names of class members who reside in each [sitate and the
estimated proportionate share of the claims of such members to the entire settlement," or
if unavailable a reasonable estimate of those amounts; and (8) any judicial opinion regard-
ing the settlement. Id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b)(1)-(8)). The statute also dis-
cusses the notice requirements in suits involving depository institutions. See id. (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1715(c)(1)-(2)).
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B. Virginia Legislation
As with most General Assembly sessions, there were several
bills introduced which would have impacted the practice of prod-
uct liability law in Virginia,'57 but the vast majority were either
not enacted or never left committee. Nonetheless, a few important
bills were passed by the General Assembly this year.
1. Waiver of Formal Process
Enacting legislation conforming to the rules currently in place
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the General Assembly
provided that "[i]n an action pending in circuit court, the plaintiff
may notify a defendant of the commencement of the action and
request that the defendant waive service of process" and that any
person who receives such a request "has a duty to avoid any un-
necessary costs of serving process."158 Such requests for a waiver
must: (1) be in writing addressed to the individual defendant or
an officer, director, or registered agent of a corporate defendant;
(2) be dispatched through first-class mail; (3) be accompanied by a
copy of the initial pleading; (4) inform the defendant of the conse-
quences of complying and not complying with the request; (5)
state the date on which the request is sent; (6) allow no more
than thirty days (sixty days if outside of Virginia) for the defen-
dant to respond; and (7) provide an extra copy of the notice and
address and a prepaid means of returning the compliance in writ-
157. For example, House Bills 1544 and 1693 would have placed a $250,000 limitation
on noneconomic damages in all medical malpractice cases, with such limit to include re-
coveries for attorney fees. See H.B. 1544, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2005); H.B. 1693,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2005). Also, House Bill 1702 would have allowed the prac-
tices and procedures for introducing evidence in general district courts in Virginia to also
apply to those cases removed from general district court to circuit court in instances where
the amount in controversy does not exceed $15,000. See H.B. 1702, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 2005).
House Bill 2926 would have immunized manufacturers of firearms and ammunition
from civil liability for damages incurred solely as a result of the criminal use of their fire-
arms or ammunition. See H.B. 2926, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2005). Such immunity
would not have attached, however, in those instances where the guns were sold or other-
wise distributed illegally. See id. This legislation was introduced in response to numerous
successful efforts around the country to hold handgun manufacturers liable to victims'
families and governmental entities for the damages incurred as a result of the criminal
use of their products.
158. Act of Mar. 28, 2005, ch. 866, 2005 Va. Acts 1489 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-286.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
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ing.'59 Those parties that comply with the request are not re-
quired to file a grounds of defense, answer, or other responsive
pleading until sixty days after the date on which the request for a
waiver was sent (ninety days if outside of Virginia).'
2. Obtaining Documents Already Subpoenaed Without a
Subpoena
Virginia Code section 8.01-417 was amended to provide that
[ulnless otherwise ordered for good cause shown, when one party to a
civil proceeding subpoenas documents, the subpoenaing party, upon
receipt of the subpoenaed documents, shall, if requested in writing,
provide true and full copies of the same to any other party or to the
attorney for any other party.
161
When requested, however, the requesting party is required to pay
"the reasonable cost of copying or reproducing the subpoenaed
documents." 62
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Virginia federal and state courts have considered a
number of cases involving product liability issues over the past
couple of years, none of those decisions have significantly changed
the landscape of product liability law. Whether the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 will reduce the number of product liability
cases in Virginia and across the country will only be determined
with the passage of time. It appears, however, that the status of
product liability law in Virginia is firm and unlikely to change
significantly in the coming years.
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-286.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
160. Id. § 8.01-286.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
161. Id. § 8.01-417(B) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
162. Id.
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